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doubtedly numerous during the years of depression in the nineties. Apparently we find in the author's reasoning the double assumption, first, that the uncorrected total of incoming aliens during a decade increases the population at the end of the decade by their exact number, and, second, that all of the immigrants going to these specified states settled in the cities; of course, in general, immigrants do settle in the cities of our industrial states in very large proportions, but it is not good statistics to assume that 100 per cent of them do so.

Great credit, however, is due the author for valuable pioneering in a most fertile and promising field, and the usefulness of this book, it is to be hoped, will justify another edition in which typographical errors, occasional infelicities of expression, and a certain looseness of statistical treatment throughout may be corrected.

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Éléments de sociologie. Par P. CAULLET. Paris: Librairie des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, Rivière et Cie. Pp. 356.

The author of this interesting work declares in his preface that he does not intend to set forth any new sociological theory, but to offer a summary of results upon which the most authoritative sociologists are substantially agreed, or of points which, if somewhat divergent as stated by their original authors, may readily be brought into a synthesis.

He precedes each chapter by a bibliography. These bibliographies include only books that are accessible in French, the American authors mentioned being Ward, Giddings, and Baldwin. If one were to attempt to name the authorities upon whom he most depends, in the order of their importance to this work, the list would be somewhat as follows: Roberty, Tarde, Durkheim, Comte, Spencer, DeGreef, Bouglé, Worms, and perhaps Waxwiler, Coste, and Conséntini.

The author proposes a study of sociology, considered as an abstract science. However, he devotes the two closing chapters to plans of social amelioration; and, like others of the sociologists whose work he summarizes, he exhibits the hope that socialism may be so developed and modified as to prove an available program of progress.

In its treatment of "abstract sociology" the book is proportionally fullest on the subjects of method and scope, which occupy the first six of its twenty-two chapters. In replying to the question: What characterizes social phenomena, as a distinct class requiring to be studied by a distinct science? he recalls the answer of René Worms: co-operation

between the thoughts or actions of different persons, whether few or many; and that of Durkheim: external constraint, such as that of law, morality, and conventionality; and that of DeGreef: contractualism, express or implied; and that of Tarde: the contact of spirits in which thoughts and desires become the property of minds in which they did not originate. But he gives chief emphasis to the answer that social phenomena are a realm of finalism, that is, of definite conscious desires which, by a sort of illusion, even seem to play the part of causes. If it were objected that this does not constitute a ground of distinction between social and individual action, M. Caulet would reply that any desires that could be developed by individuals in total isolation would be, like the desires of animals, merely physiological phenomena, having only an indirect interest for sociology. It is true that desires, once evolved, like other elements of social reality, play a part in social causation; moreover, tracing the relation between desires and other social phenomena may be accepted as one of the several methods of sociology. Nevertheless he says that to regard desires as *the* social causes would be to imitate our ancestors who explained fire by "phlogiston" and life by "vital force." The argument at this point is a vivid reminder of the view expressed by the reviewer on "the social forces error."¹ M. Caulett correctly excludes geographic, ethnographic (biologic), and demographic facts (number, density, etc.) from the sphere of social realities, recognizing them only as among the conditions that help to cause and to explain the social phenomena.

In his attempt to synthesize the various answers to the question: What is the essential characteristic of social reality? the author happily imitates Le Dantec's definition of biological reality, with this result: Sociology studies those traits which are common to all social phenomena and absent from all organic or inorganic phenomena.

In classifying social phenomena he adopts the main distinction made by Roberty between social thought and social action. Far from regarding economic facts as the foundation of all other social realities, he teaches that without social thoughts economic phenomena would not be social but only biological realities, and that economic facts are effects, not causes of social thought, although, like many other phenomena, once produced they react powerfully upon their cause. His classification is as follows: (I) phenomena of social thought, (1) scientific, (2) philosophic, (3) aesthetic; (II) phenomena of social action, (1) economic,

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, XIV, pp. 613, 642; and *Proceedings of The American Sociological Society*, V.

(2) juridical, (3) political. Economics, jurisprudence, and political science he regards as "the hierarchy of special sociological sciences." Some might be inclined to comment that if he were true to his definition which was given above, on the analogy of the definition of general biology, he would reserve the word "sociological" to designate studies of traits common to all the phenomena included in this classification, and not claim, as he does both here and in his later summary, that the special social sciences are provinces within general sociology. To place the phenomena of social thought and of social action in the two separate main divisions of his classification suggests the question whether it would not be truer to facts, and a better guide to investigation, to recognize thought and action as distinguishable elements in social phenomena or nearly every class, rather than as two main divisions of social phenomena. Science and philosophy are indeed made up almost entirely of thought-elements, but the practical arts which he classifies as actions are made up largely of thought elements, and in the aesthetic phenomena feeling-elements largely predominate.

The second "book" of the work is entitled "The Genesis of Social Phenomena," and the third and last is entitled "The Evolution of Social Phenomena." These two titles most American sociologists would have used as designations for phases of the subject-matter belonging in one "book" in a treatise on sociology. The subject of social origin and evolution is only briefly discussed.

The second "book" contains a most interesting introductory chapter on the relation between sociology and psychology. Here is set forth the doctrine of the "bio-social hypothesis," according to Roberty. This doctrine is that mentality, as well as individuality, is a social product, that cerebral physiology and sociology supply all the abstract and fundamental principles for the explanation of mental life; that physiology and sociology are abstract fundamental sciences, as physics and chemistry are, and that they are to psychology what physics and chemistry are to geology, that is to say, just as geology is an application of the principles of physics and chemistry to a special set of concrete problems, so also psychology is an application of the principles of cerebral physiology and of sociology to the explanation of mental life, so that psychology, like geology, is not an abstract and fundamental science but only a "concrete" science, depending for all its ultimate explanations upon the fundamental sciences from which its explanatory principles must be borrowed.

The more usual view among American sociologists has been that

while the content of mental life, which constitutes individuality and composes social realities, is indeed a social product, still the method and mechanism of conscious life is not necessarily dependent upon association but antecedent to association, and while the method as well as the mechanism of consciousness may require biological explanation, yet the investigation of them is a study so important, so exacting, and so different from the rest of biology, that it is proper to regard it as a science by itself; and furthermore, that this science of psychology is fundamental to sociology much as chemistry is fundamental to biology, and as every antecedent science in Comte's hierarchy is fundamental to those which follow.

It may be remarked that M. Caillet adopts the Comtian hierarchy of the sciences, though criticizing Comte's references to psychology, and justifying the absence of psychology as well as of geology from the hierarchical list by the "bio-social hypothesis" in the manner above indicated.

Following Roberty again, the author teaches that the four essential modes in which social thought appears, namely, science, philosophy, art, and action, form a true hierarchy, developments in each of the four following each other in a strict order of causal sequence. Science, in this view, of course, includes rudimentary knowledge of particular things. Comte's doctrine of the three stages is thus set aside as a universal generalization, but it is accepted as applying to philosophy, and as having application to other social realities in so far as they are interpenetrated by philosophical ideas.

In accordance with this view that each of the particular social sciences "constitutes a branch of general sociology," "Book Three" is divided into two parts, Part One consisting of a very brief summary of results in "social geography," "social psychology," "economics," "jurisprudence," and "political science," Part Two offering a statement of general principles of the life and evolution of society as a whole.

The following five principles of social life are emphasized: (1) the principle of limits of variation, due to the boundaries set by human nature and material environment, in consequence of which we find, not an endless variety of social forms, but certain types appropriate to each stage of evolution, which reappear among different peoples who have not imitated each other; (2) the principle of continuity, comparable to the biological principle of heredity, according to which the past shapes the present in spite of the will of men; (3) the principle of correlation, easily lost sight of by social specialists, according to which social activities

of one class modify all the other activities of the same society, and even produce theological, military, industrial, and other social types; (4) the principle of equivalence, based upon the importance of the simplest functions to all the rest, which excludes any hierarchical arrangement of social functions based upon their importance, and exhibits them in mutual subordination—that is, in equivalence; (5) the principle of differentiation, Spencer's principle of continual progression from confused homogeneity to definite and co-ordinated heterogeneity.

To these he adds that the fundamental law of social evolution is that social relationships first engender intellectual phenomena, but that intellectual phenomena, once present, so react upon their own cause that intellectual evolution issuing as it does from social realities yet is the basal determinant of social evolution.

This review cannot attempt anything like a complete enumeration of the points included under the heading of principles of general sociology as distinguished from results of the special social sciences, but one more point specially calling for mention is the fact that our author exhibits the "process" viewpoint, even saying: "There is nothing static in social reality, and nothing of anatomy, in the sense of structure, independent of function."

In referring to the agents of social progress he employs the phrase "social technician" (p. 333). He emphasizes the statement that the progress of any society can be effectively led only by an élite group which that society has itself produced.

No doubt, the rapid development of sociological thought in France precludes the possibility of presenting a complete system of sociology that would command the entire assent of all competent French writers. But the present volume derives great interest from the fact that it formulates not the results of a single system-maker, but that which an able scholar regards as a "consensus of the competent."

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An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.

By CHARLES A. BEARD. New York: Macmillan, 1913.

Pp. vii+330. \$2.25.

To those who have credulously found in the history of our constitution a story of inspired, harmonious statesmen, untainted by economic or financial interests, founding a government on the abstract speculations of political philosophy, this interesting and instructive volume will